Triangular human capital flows between sending, entrepot and the rest of the world regions by DeVoretz, Don J. & Ma, John
Special Issue on Migration and Globalization, Canadian Studies in Population
Vol.29(1), 2002, pp. 53-69
53
Triangular Human Capital Flows between Sending,
Entrepot and the Rest of the World Regions
Don J. DeVoretz
RIIM, Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, B.C. Canada
John Ma
Division of Social Sciences
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Abstract
A model of triangular movement of highly skilled immigrants between a
sending country (China/India) to an entrepot country (Canada) and then possibly
to the rest of the world is developed. The question of who stays or leaves after
arrival in the entrepot country is considered. The acquisition of subsidized
human capital and the ascension to citizenship by immigrants are argued to be
key conditioners that reduce the probability of staying in the entrepot country.
Finally, the model predicts if the best or the mediocre highly skilled stay or
leave the entrepot country for the sending region or the rest of the world.
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Résumé
A model of triangular movement of highly skilled immigrants between a
sending country (China/India) to an entrepot country (Canada) and then possibly
to the rest of the world is developed. The question of who stays or leaves after
arrival in the entrepot country is considered. The acquisition of subsidized
human capital and the ascension to citizenship by immigrants are argued to be
key conditioners that reduce the probability of staying in the entrepot country.
Finally, the model predicts if the best or the mediocre highly skilled stay or
leave the entrepot country for the sending region or the rest of the world.
Keywords: Human capital, brain drain, immigration
Introduction
In the 1990’s a debate remerged over the size and duration of Canada’s “brain
drain”, especially the transfer of human capital to the United States (DeVoretz
and Laryea, 1998, Helliwell, 1999 and Wagner, 2000). In a similar vein, D.
Zweig (1997) documented the economic and political motives for highly skilled
Chinese émigrés to remain in the United States. Similar bilateral studies have
been conducted to detect the size, duration and motivation for the movement of
the highly skilled between Europe and the rest of the world. (Ward and Kunze,
2001 and Winkleman, 2001). Implicitly what we see emerging from this
literature is a set of parallel studies assessing the effects of bilateral human
capital transfers on both the sending and receiving regions and the individual
movers. This paper proposes a new research tactic when it eschews the standard
bilateral analysis and argues that human capital transfers are part of a general
global system which transfers human capital from sending countries such as
India-China (including Hong-Kong) to entrepot countries (Canada and Europe),
and then on to the rest of the world (USA).
1
In particular, we argue that Canada is an excellent entrepot example, given its
unique immigration and integration policies and its strategic geographical
location.
2  An entrepot country in this context is defined as an intermediate
destination country, which also confers subsidized benefits on recent immigrant
arrivals. In turn, these immigrants arrivals, who may later return to their source
country, or stay in their original entrepot destination country or move to a third
destination (R.O.W.).
3 Major issues arise in the Canadian or entrepot context
from this complex trilateral movement of the highly skilled. For example, is     Triangular Human Capital Flows between Sending,
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Canada participating in a zero (or negative) sum game? In other words, do the
immigrant arrivals from outside of North America to Canada just offset or not
the loss of highly skilled Canadian émigrés to the United States and the ROW?
4
Moreover, do Canadian trained highly skilled leave as a consequence of
competition from recent highly skilled arrivals ?
5Do the highly skilled
immigrants that remain in Canada have an inferior (superior) skill set when
compared to those immigrants who return or move on to the rest of the world?
6
Furthermore, what are the roles respectively of the entrepot labor market and its
immigration (emigration) policies in sorting the immigrants into stayers or
movers after they arrive in the entrepot country? 
7
Implications of this human capital transfer on the sending region can also be
profound, especially if the sending region is less developed (e.g. India-China).
For example, how large is the taxpayer subsidy from the sending country to
Canada? Furthermore, how long will it take before a reverse flow occurs from
the entrepot country to the source country? Moreover, what fraction of the
original leavers will return home and why? Are these leavers the most or least
able of the highly skilled?
Finally will the rest of the world gain twice?  In other words, will the initial
Chinese (or Indian) highly skilled immigrants to the entrepot country (Canada/
EU) self-select and move on to the rest of the world, with the entrepot country’s
providing subsidized human capital (language training, etc)? Will these migrants
to the rest of the world (USA) be more (or less) productive than those
immigrants who remain in the entrepot (Canada) or return home (China)?
 
In order to draw explicit hypotheses from this stylized view of the world, we
present figure 1, which schematically re-produces the potential movement
pattern outlined above.
Figure 1. Triangular Human Capital Transfers:
     Entrepot
              Sender         RowDon J. DeVoretz and John Ma
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We argue that there initially exists three proto-typical sending regions, India,
China, and Hong-Kong, and three possible receiving regions:  an entrepot
destination (Canada-Europe), the USA, and after a period of time abroad the
home or the sending region.
Furthermore, we note that three options, or types of movement, exist for each
emigrant after the initial move to the entrepot country over two separate periods
in residence in the entrepot country.
8 These options include staying in the new
entrepot country (Canada), returning to the origin country, or moving on to a
third country (ROW).  In addition, multiple permutations of these types of
immigrant movements can arise, and complex patterns appear which will now
blur the traditional categories of temporary (less than one year) and permanent
moves.  Permutations of this three-stage movement become complex when
multiple moves are considered.  For example, the initial movement from the
sending to entrepot country can next result in an onward move to the rest of the
world, followed by a final move back to the original sending country.  This
example essentially describes Hong Kong emigres to Canada who originally
came from the PRC and, after their stay in Canada, later returned to Hong Kong
as Canadian citizens.  They now are able to easily enter China, their original
sending country, as Canadian citizens resident in Hong Kong.
In order to simplify the model, we initially start with two sending regions: India-
China, for the initial immigrant move, and the entrepot destinations either
Canada or Europe.
9 However, first we must recognize that the vast majority of
highly trained people do not emigrate from the original sending region. Thus, a
fundamental question we must answer is how does the sorting mechanism,
which allocates stayers and leavers within the sending country, work?
Moreover, what factors determine if the best of the highly skilled leave and the
mediocre stay, or vice-versa? Moreover, if educated people do move from India
or China to Canada  is the impetus to leave Canada a  result of  immigrant
acquiring subsidized complementary human capital at the entrepot destination ?
The implication of this action would be that the brightest of the educated would
be leaving since they have acquired further human capital.
10
Given this two-stage investment behavior, a new series of questions arise in the
entrepot destination. First, does this initial educational investment by the
potential immigrant in the origin country arise due to a subsidy? Moreover, is
strategic  behavior involved? In other words, do people invest in a low
educational cost (high tax) environment and move to higher educational cost but
lower tax environments to improve their rate of return on their educational
investment ?
 11 Clearly, an overlapping generations model can arise.  In this
case, for example, the progeny of Chinese immigrants to Canada and/or Europe
can acquire their education in Canada or Europe and make their next move to
either the SAR, PRC, or USA.  Does this strategic behaviour, which is good for
the individual, create public finance externalities which are bad for the state or
taxpayer? 
12     Triangular Human Capital Flows between Sending,
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Given these posed questions, the modelling process, which characterizes this
trilateral flow, is best formulated in three stages. The first stage is to model who
stays in the sending country and why. DeVoretz and Iturralde (2000) argue that
demographic arguments, or the head of household’s stage in the life cycle,
condition the probability of staying for a highly skilled worker in a developed
country. This is because the entrepot state by definition is the only state to
confer subsidized public goods on highly skilled stayers differentially over their
life cycle.  For example, university education, health care, and subsidized
daycare are all conferred on the household when the highly skilled head is
middle aged with children.  Epstein, et al., (1999) also argue that, in the context
of a poor sending country, the probability of moving is a function of the state’s
(or Emperor’s) willingness to confer benefits on or tax the highly skilled.  In
either a developed or less developed milieu, two additional questions must be
posed and answered in the context of the model. At what stage in the life-cycle
does the  greatest (least) risk of staying (or leaving) occur and what non-
economic forces influence this decision to stay (leave) ?
13
Once we model and determine who stays and who leaves the sending country,
we must next model the motivation for immigrant’s long-term behaviour after
he/she initially arrives at the entrepot destination. Will the immigrant be a
permanent resident in the original entrepot destination country, return to the
sending country, or move on to the rest of the world (ROW)? Before we answer
these questions we must ask why, after arrival in the entrepot destination, would
anyone return to their origin country or move on to a third destination?   On the
surface, return migration appears to be a product of economic disappointment.
However, the economics of this return decision are much more complex than an
explanation based upon simple failure in the entrepot destination country.
14 In a
similar vein, it is initially difficult to rationalize onward migration to the ROW.
In short, if the immigrant did not want to go to the original entrepot destination,
why did he/she simply not initially move to the ultimate rest of the world
(ROW) residence?
15 Finally, what arguments best rationalize the behaviour of
immigrants who follow sequential repeat patterns, first moving to the entrepot
country, next returning to home (or ROW), and then repeating the process? 
16
As we earlier noted, we introduce several agents, an Emperor in the country of
origin and two immigrant settlement agents in the entrepot country, to help us
understand the process of initial, return, and on going immigrant movements. In
short, we assert that each agent, in either the sending or entrepot country,
dispenses gifts or services on a stayer or a potential mover which influences
their decision to either stay, move on, or return to the original sending country.
We outline the various agents’ roles below in both the sending and entrepot
countries.Don J. DeVoretz and John Ma
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Emperor and Emigrants
As earlier stated Epstein et al.. (1999) argue that the role of the Emperor -
typically in the sending country - is to raise taxes, which in turn allows him to
dispense favors to cliques within his society. These favored cliques in turn must
lobby the Emperor to insure that they continue to receive these gifts from the
Emperor and pay the minimum taxes for these benefits. This lobbying effort is
both complex and expensive in two dimensions. First, time is involved in
lobbying the Emperor for your presumed favors; and, secondly, the outcome
from lobbying is often unknown. Additionally, the potential highly skilled
émigré is heavily taxed by the Emperor to help finance the Emperor’s gifts.
17 It
is quite possible under these circumstances that the total value of the gifts
conferred on the population by the Emperor may be dissipated in lost output as
his subjects lobby in lieu of productive activity. Under these conditions of
uncertainty with respect to the outcome of your lobbying efforts and the
simultaneous existence of differential time costs for lobbying across the
potential émigré population, differential-lobbying efforts will emerge. For our
skill group, namely highly trained and potentially mobile workers, their optimal
amount of lobbying in the absence of mobility rights is unclear. If the highly
skilled are rewarded according to their productivity in wages or salary in the
empire and the Emperors taxes or sanctions varies, then the lobbying efforts on
the potential emigres would depend on how effective these efforts would be in
protecting their income.
18  Regardless of their lobbying efforts and ultimate
rewards, the highly skilled are still taxed. Now, if the Emperor introduces a
mobility option, the highly skilled will leave if the Emperor’s reward to the
prospective émigré is less than their time cost of lobbying and taxes paid. 
19This
of course begs the question why the Emperor would ever permit the highly
skilled to leave. We return to that question later, but simply note here that the
omnipotent Emperor would only confer mobility rights to the resident highly
skilled population if there exists a high enough probability of return migration
by a sufficient number of the best of the highly skilled emigres.
20
But the role of the Emperor in conditioning mobility does not stop here after the
skilled subject has decided to emigrate or stay. The Emperor can control the exit
conditions of his subjects and their return conditions.
    It is important to note
that, in the actual case of China circa 2001, the government does not permit free
mobility.  You must gain permission to leave, which is either more or less
lenient depending on the nature of travel.  The Emperor’s role in influencing the
émigré after he leaves is crucial to understand, otherwise it would be difficult to
rationalize why a successful émigré – as opposed to a failed émigré – would
ever return to the Emperor’s Kingdom. After all, the emigrant revealed his/her
preference by leaving after her/his lobbying for benefits had failed. Thus, it
would be difficult to rationalize why a successful émigré would decide to return
to this environment without introducing an Emperor who later confers benefits
or removes psychic costs on the returning ex-patriot.
21     Triangular Human Capital Flows between Sending,
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Essential to rationalizing any potential return emigration is a knowledge of the
power of the Emperor to impose conditions on the potential returning émigré.
The Emperor often imposes return conditions, which include some form of a
surety bond. This bond can be in the form of money held in escrow by the
Emperor. Indirect sanctions, which are tantamount to a surety bond, include the
Emperor’s bank discounting immigrant remittances when converted into local
currency, or withholding exit visas for family residents still in the Empire.  In a
more positive manner, the Emperor can bribe the émigré to return with enhanced
employment and social conditions after her return.
In sum, the Emperor’s actions can condition who initially stays at home, who
leaves the Kingdom, and who returns to the Kingdom after leaving.
22
Agents in the Entrepot Country
After the move to the entrepot country, a second agent- a settlement worker-
now enters the decision process of the recent immigrant arrival to the entrepot
country. After arrival the immigrant faces the decision to  stay in the entrepot
destination, return home, or move on to the rest of the world. Again the decision
process is a nested one. First, after the highly skilled immigrant arrives, he/she
must decide to stay or not at the end of each period. If the decision is to stay,
then the immigration chain ends. However, when the immigrant is pushed out of
the entrepot country by an unexpectedly bad labour experience, or is lured to the
rest of the world by a higher return to the newly acquired human capital, the
triangular movement continues to the third stage. In other words, the emigrant
who has decided not to stay in the entrepot destination must now decide to
return home or move on to the rest of the world (ROW).
23 The actions of another
agent, in this case the immigrant settlement worker in the entrepot country, will
again influence if the émigré returns home or moves on to the rest of the world.
In fact, in the entrepot country two types, private and public, settlement workers
appear. The private or volunteer settlement agent offers the recent arrival
specific human capital, whilst a second government worker offers a public good
with positive externalities in period 2.
Period One: Settlement Worker One
After arrival, the recent immigrant is offered subsidized general human capital
training (language, knowledge of labour market channels, cultural conventions)
and specific human capital (programming skills, retraining for certification, and
access to modern technology) by settlement worker one. The agent’s goal in this
case is to increase the probability of staying for the recent immigrant at the end
of period one.
24  As Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) have shown, acquisition of
different types of specific human capital can increase the probability that aDon J. DeVoretz and John Ma
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portion of the highly skilled immigrant arrivals will leave (or stay). Thus, this
settlement worker’s activity can perversely affect the staying probability and in
addition may produce distributional consequences on the quality of those who
stay and those who leave. As Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) argue, the best (or
weakest) of the highly skilled immigrant arrivals may in turn, return home or
move on to the rest of the world at the end of period one. The direction of the
move, and the quality of the highly skilled sojourner, ultimately depend on the
rates of return from the newly acquired human capital in the entrepot country.
In sum, the settlement worker’s activities in period one can increase (decrease)
the probability of staying (leaving) for the best (or weakest) immigrant arrivals.
Moreover, only one outcome in three (at end of period one), namely staying, is
the preferred goal of the settlement agent. The other two outcomes are inferior
for the settlement worker, but not necessarily for the potential émigré. In
addition, the model predicts that only those types of human capital acquisition
that enhance the rate of return in the entrepot country relative to the ROW or
sending region will enhance the probability of staying in the entrepot country.
25
Thus, in period one the greater the acquisition of agent provided specific (to
Canada) human capital relative to the private acquisition of general (to the
ROW) human capital acquisition the greater the probability of staying in the
entrepot country. 
26
Period Two: Settlement Worker Two
 If the newly arrived immigrant decides to remain in the entrepot destination at
the end of period one, the second agent or settlement worker two enters and
confers additional benefits. Again these benefits, which now arrive in the form
of a public good, are intended to increase the probability of staying in the
entrepot destination in subsequent periods. However, the benefits conferred may
act perversely to induce the resident immigrant to leave. The main public good,
which offers free rider benefits, is citizenship. If the immigrant remains in the
entrepot country in period two and ascends to citizenship, then the immigrant’s
job opportunities rise and the mobility costs of moving to the rest of the world
will fall.
27 The free rider problem arises when erstwhile immigrants receive
citizenship (and the accompanying passport) and the free mobility derived from
the good behavior of older vintages of citizens in the entrepot country. The best
example of this acquisition of a public good is the immigrant who receives
citizenship in the entrepot country when his previous citizenship had limited
mobility rights. For example a Chinese immigrant to Canada (or any EU
member country) who eventually acquires entrepot citizenship is then free to
travel to the United States (or to any EU member country). Now this sojourning
émigré is free to exploit the specific human capital acquired in a subsidized
manner in period one in the entrepot country, when heretofore they could not
enter this third country. 
28     Triangular Human Capital Flows between Sending,
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At this point in period two the Emperor in the original sending country can
reappear and raise the costs of the entrepot immigrant’s departure to the rest of
the world in period two and influence the potential émigré’s probability of
returning home. If the Emperor cashes in the bond that is held at home, or more
punitively revokes the emigrant’s citizenship in the home country upon
citizenship acquisition in the entrepot country, the probability of leaving for the
rest of the world is reduced.  A variation of this behavior arises when the
entrepot country confers citizenship on the immigrant and requires that he/she
renounce home country citizenship.  Germany and USA currently do this, but
Canada does not.  The Emperor of course can induce return migration and
deflect a potential move to the ROW by acting in a positive fashion and
conferring unique benefits on the potential émigré after he/she acquires
citizenship in the entrepot country and returns home. It is all a matter of which
policy, punitive or benign, appears to be the most efficient mechanism a priori
to the Emperor to induce return migration of the very highly skilled from the
entrepot country.
In sum, the model at this stage can predict the probability of staying in the
entrepot country and the perverse effects of incentives produced by the entrepot
settlement workers providing human capital and public goods in periods one and
two. Now any outcome in period two in the entrepot destination is possible, with
either highly skilled or less skilled people staying or the best of the highly
skilled returning home or moving on to the rest of the world as a consequence of
these three agents’ actions. What ultimately determines whether immigrants stay
in the entrepot destination or move on is the rate of return of their acquired
capital in the three settlement regions, actions of the Emperor and the
immigrant’s stage in the life cycle.
Period three: Rest of the world and beyond
A subset of the original leavers at end of period two may now have moved on to
the rest of the world. This result may be Pareto optimal but may have
distributional consequences on both the original sending country and the
entrepot holding state.
29  We review these outcomes below.
To deduce the number and quality of movers from the entrepot country to the
ROW we must describe a stylized environment in the ROW.  Foremost among
the institutional conditions in the ROW is the resident tenure of the newly
arrived émigré from the entrepot country. Two entry options are available – the
immigrant may apply to use the permanent entry gate or the renewable
(indefinitely) temporary entry gate. The former has a strict quota and the latter
has no quota, so uncertainty of admission arises in the permanent entry gate.
30
The permanent entry gate reproduces the environment in stage two for the
immigrant in the entrepot country. The reward from the extra time spent waiting
in the queue for permanent entry is the possible ascension to citizenship in theDon J. DeVoretz and John Ma
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ROW destination.  Temporary immigration to the ROW, on the other hand, may
be of two types, with and without a queue. Citizenship in the entrepot country
allows the highly skilled immigrant to move to ROW without waiting in a
queue, thus lowering the cost of movement.
31
The second important dimension in the ROW which conditions the type of
émigré arrival from the entrepot country is the reward structure that the highly
skilled émigré faces upon arrival. Since, by definition, the ROW confers no
public goods on the émigré the ROW tax rates are low and less progressive than
other destinations. The resulting income distribution under this tax regime is
more unequal with a higher mean income and greater variance for any highly
skilled occupation than the income distribution in the entrepot or sending
countries.
In sum, the institutional setting of the ROW is a low tax environment with an
unequal income distribution and a flexible but temporary immigrant entry point
open uniquely to entrepot citizens. These pre-conditions will hasten the exodus
of most highly skilled erstwhile entrepot immigrants.
One other feature of the ROW, its absolute size, manifests itself in several
dimensions and is crucial to the analysis.  The ROW economy (USA or EU) is
absolutely large and hence this increases the probability of the émigré making a
successful job match.
32 Thus, in this expanded labour market an outstanding
talent will have greater absolute chance of a successful job match, which
exploits his/her unique, but outstanding skills. This scale effect, owing to an
absolutely larger labour market, increases the probability of the most talented
leaving the entrepot country for the ROW economy due to a higher probability
of a successful job match.
In addition, the larger population in the ROW implies that the associated ethnic
population will also be larger than in the entrepot country.  This large ethnic
population represents a potential social safety net that encourages the arrival of
less talented, but still highly skilled, emigres from the entrepot country, since, if
they fail in the mainstream labour market in the ROW, they can find
employment in the large ethnic market.
In sum, if we assume that the potential pool of emigres from the entrepot
destination to the ROW is risk neutral, both the number and quality distribution
of the leavers can now be determined. At the first stage of residence in the
entrepot country the highly skilled immigrant will only leave if their reservation
wage in the entrepot country is at least matched by the expected income gain
earned by moving to the ROW.
33  The stylized facts reported by DeVoretz and
Iturralde (2000) indicate that  the population at risk of moving will be relatively
young, small in size relative to the immigrant cohort in the entrepot country, and
have an extensive prior mobility experience.
34  Thus unattached, post-secondary
school leavers, who are less than 35-years-old, will form the bulk of the émigré     Triangular Human Capital Flows between Sending,
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group. Given my earlier arguments about labour market scale and ethnic
population size, this group will in turn be the most and least talented of the
resident émigré pool in the entrepot country.
The public finance impact of émigrés on the ROW is unambiguous, since it
receives immigrants embodied with other countries’ taxpayer financed human
capital. In turn by definition the ROW does not provide this generation of
emigres any publicly financed goods - hence net tax receipts must rise in the
ROW. The income distribution effect of the resident highly skilled in the ROW
is however unclear.  The wage impact derived from the arrival of both the best
and least talented of the highly skilled who emigrate from the entrepot to the
ROW can raise or lower the wage rate for the average highly skilled resident in
the ROW, and perhaps eliminate bottle necks.
Finally, we can infer from these conditions in the ROW that the mediocre highly
skilled and most risk-adverse of the potential emigres (middle-aged) will most
likely remain in the entrepot destination.
35
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End Notes:
1.   An entrepot country is one in which traditionally exported goods are held in
storage to be re-exported at a later date. Thus, Singapore and Hong-Kong
were traditional entrepot centres. In this context, an entrepot country is an
immigrant receiving country which provides human capital to the
immigrant before she/he emigrates.
2.   McInnis (2001) argues persuasively that Canada’s emigration experience in
the last half of the 19
th  century can be partially characterized by this
entrepot model for its then 19
th century semi and skilled labour movement
from Canada to the United States.
3.   Canada  is one particular example of an entrepot country. Other examples
exist, namely Israel, Ireland, Germany, the United Kingdom and perhaps
the entire European Union.Don J. DeVoretz and John Ma
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4.   Israel could be another zero sum case in point. Here Russian émigrés may be
replacing Sabra (native-born) Israelis who have left for the rest of the world.
A similar pattern may be emerging in the SAR or Hong Kong when
Mainland Chinese engineers replace Hong Kong engineers in the SAR who
have left for North America.
5.   This general equilibrium effect is unlikely in reality since Canada’s highly
skilled immigration policy is predicated on the existence of positive excess
demand for highly skilled in the Canadian economy. Empirical work by
Akbar and DeVoretz (1993) confirms this assertion.
6.   This model is capable of predicting the skill level of the movers and stayers
if we visualize the state as a tax agent who provides services to its
immigrant clients. Borrowing on the work of Epstein et. al (1999) as noted
in the test if Emperor (or state) redistributes benefits away from the highly
skilled and the lobbying costs are too high to recover these lost benefits then
the highly skilled will leave. The cited work of DeVoretz and Itturalde
(2000) with its stayer model empirically tests and confirms the existence of
sorting in the Canadian context circa 1992-96.
7.   As noted later, the ROW countries are characterized by the lack of agents.
Since these states provide no services their tax rates are low and those
emigrants who anticipate to realize incomes on the extreme right hand side
of the distribution or the highly skilled will leave the entrepot country for
the ROW. This argument is embedded in the Borjas and Bratsberg model
(1996) and simply extended here.
8.   This model needs at least two periods since agents in the entrepot destination
country must equip the immigrant arrivals with human capital and offer a
public good which will influence the immigrant’s decision to stay or move
on in the second period.
9.   Clearly the potential immigrant from China-India could directly enter the
United States. We ignore this option since we want to focus on the impact
of immigration-emigration in the highly skilled context of an entrepot
country such as Canada. In addition, the USA only has a modest entry gate
for permanent highly skilled (E class visa) immigrants. Thus, in fact the
USA is not the initial destination of the majority of highly skilled
permanent Chinese immigrants.
10.  Borjas and Bratsburg (1996) argue that only if the acquired human capital in
the entrepot country is complementary to existing capital in the USA or the
original sending region would the best leave. If the immigrant arrivals
receive human capital in the entrepot countries which yields a higher return
by staying (second language acquisition) then the brightest would stay in
the entrepot country.     Triangular Human Capital Flows between Sending,
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11. Naïve economic theory would answer this question in the affirmative.
However, transactions costs loom large in any move and they grow over the
household’s lifetime. Finally, people stay to access public goods in the high
tax environment. Hence, the answer to the question is not at all obvious.
12.  See Anderson and Konrad (2001). In particular, they explore the effect of
increased mobility or globalization on the incentives to invest in human
capital, with and without subsidies, and in the absence of an insurance
scheme to forestall the impact of post-investment taxation on the returns to
human capital.
13.  By adapting the complete DeVoretz-Iturralde (2000) stayer model to this
circulation model these questions can be answered.
14.  This is the naïve explanation owing to the Neo-classical arguments of the
1980’s and earlier. Clearly, return migrants who have acquired
complementary human capital in the entrepot country have not failed but
are motivated to return by a higher reward in the original sending country.
15.  As noted immigrant quotas prevent most highly skilled immigrants from
directly entering either the USA or Hong Kong from China.
16.  For a minority of Chinese immigrants to Canada this repeated movement
has earned them the term astronauts.
17.  In China, one of our selected countries, intellectuals and the highly trained
have had, in the past, their privileges removed as they were banished to the
countryside in the late 1960’s. In the absence of immigration, their human
capital and the country’s output suffered. However, in the 1990’s,
intellectuals and other skilled workers (under some restrictions) are free to
leave China.
18.  Clearly if the required lobbying effort is small to successfully protect your
job, this limited action will be carried out, and the individual will stay given
the high costs of movement.
19. This condition holds for those potential emigres who are on the margin
where mobility costs just equal gain from moving. These added costs
imposed by the Emperor push the marginal highly skilled immigrants. See
Epstein et al.. (1999) for a complete exposition of this point in the form of a
formal proof.Don J. DeVoretz and John Ma
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20.  In order to offset the loss of productivity to the Empire from the permitted
emigration, a sufficient number of immigrants must return with added
training to offset the loss of those who remain. In this sense the best must
return in sufficient numbers.
21.  For example, upon return the conditions of extant family members may be
improved by granting them benefits that they formally did not enjoy.
22.  It should be remembered that an optimistic Emperor believed that mobility
rights would allow the highly skilled to emigrate, gain skills in the entrepot
country and then return with skills which would increase productivity in the
Empire. This is all predicated on a sufficient number of return emigres from
the entrepot to the sending country. When this optimism is not realized as in
China circa 2002 the Emperor must resort to bribes.
23.  Formally the decision as argued by DeVoretz and Iturralde (2000a) is that
the reservation wage, which keeps the potential émigré in the entrepot
country, is now exceeded by either (or both) the potential income gains in
the ROW or sending country after the enhancement of human capital and
the acquisition of entrepot citizenship in the entrepot country. If the
immigrant does not gain human capital appropriate for the production
functions in the ROW and/or the sending country but specific to the
entrepot country, then the income gain from staying will exceed the gain
from leaving. See DeVoretz and Itturalde (2000) for a more complete
exposition of this condition.
24. The settlement worker by definition provides human capital to increase the
productivity of all immigrant arrivals in the entrepot society and reduce the
risk of return migration. Settlement workers may also have altruistic
motives, namely to ease the immigrant’s integration into society. However,
in entrepot countries such as Australia, Canada, Germany, and especially
Israel, government subsidies to private altruistic agencies is predicated on
increasing the staying probability of the recent arrival and to increase the
immigrant’s contribution to the society. To this extent this governmental
motive is not altruistic.
25. In the Canadian context human capital acquisition for the Canadian economy
is the central investment made by the agent in period 1. Examples include:
access to labour market information,  validation of certificates, recognition
of professional credentials and language training (English and French).
26.  Thus, immigrants who enter post-secondary education to acquire a general
(to the ROW) skill with little or no specific human capital acquisition from
an agent in period 1 will be more apt to leave.     Triangular Human Capital Flows between Sending,
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27.  The mobility costs for Chinese immigrants living in Canada without
Canadian citizenship are the waiting and legal costs to obtain a permanent
visa (E type) for the USA. These are considerable costs. With Canadian
citizenship a NAFTA visa is obtained the same day as application with no
lawyer required. Furthermore, there is no queue for this NAFTA visa and
thus the probability of entry is certain if side conditions are met.
28.  Both the European Union and Canada (or the United States) allow
immigrants who acquire citizenship in their respective areas to enter into a
merged labour market.
29.  If there exist positive externalities from a country’s brain drain as argued by
Stark (1997) then the number of movers under a market solution would be
sub-optimal. Obviously if there are negative externalities on production in
the sending region from this movement as the traditional brain drain
literature argued in the 1970’s, then the free market solution is too large.
30.  A variation of this tenure is temporary status with an overall quota and end
date. The “green card “, or temporary highly skilled immigrant recruitment
program in Germany, and the H1B temporary worker visa program in the
United States, both are illustrations of this variation.
31. The temporary entry gate to the ROW with a queue is available to any
entrepot immigrant (or any highly skilled immigrant in the world); however,
the time cost plus legal fees are substantial.  Thus, the existence of unique
non-queue entry gate for entrepot immigrants (with entrepot citizenship)
reduces the transactions costs and the time in queue.  This will hasten the
departure of those eligible to use this gate.
32.  The ROW by definition is so large that even if it has a relative disadvantage
in one or more skills relative to the entrepot country , the ROW will still
have a larger labour market for that skill.
33.  As DeVoretz and Iturralde (2001) have shown this is a small percentage of
the stock of potential movers, approximately 5 to 20 per cent.
34.  These conditions either increased the probable income gain from a move or
lowered the mobility costs of movement.Don J. DeVoretz and John Ma
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3 Canada is one particular example of an entrepot country. Other
examples exist, namely Israel, Ireland, Germany, the United
Kingdom and perhaps the entire European Union.
4 Israel could be another zero sum case in point. Here Russian
émigrés may be replacing Sabra (native-born) Israelis who have
left for the rest of the world. A similar pattern may be emerging in
the SAR or Hong Kong when Mainland Chinese engineers replace
Hong Kong engineers in the SAR who have left for North
America.
5 This general equilibrium effect is unlikely in reality since
Canada’s highly skilled immigration policy is predicated on the
existence of positive excess demand for highly skilled in the
Canadian economy. Empirical work by Akbar and DeVoretz
(1993) confirms this assertion.
6 This model is capable of predicting the skill level of the movers
and stayers if we visualize the state as a tax agent who provides
services to its immigrant clients. Borrowing on the work of Epstein
et. al (1999) as noted in the test if Emperor (or state) redistributes
benefits away from the highly skilled and the lobbying costs are
too high to recover these lost benefits then the highly skilled will
leave. The cited work of DeVoretz and Itturalde (2000) with its
stayer model empirically tests and confirms the existence of
sorting in the Canadian context circa 1992-96.
7 As noted later, the ROW countries are characterized by the lack
of agents. Since these states provide no services their tax rates are
low and those emigrants who anticipate to realize incomes on the
extreme right hand side of the distribution or the highly skilled will
leave the entrepot country for the ROW. This argument is
embedded in the Borjas and  Bratsberg model (1996) and simply
extended here.
8 This model needs at least two periods since agents in the entrepot
destination country must equip the immigrant arrivals with human
capital and offer a public good which will influence the
immigrant’s decision to stay or move on in the second period.
9 Clearly the potential immigrant from China-India could directly
enter the United States. We ignore this option since we want to
focus on the impact of immigration-emigration in the highly     Triangular Human Capital Flows between Sending,
Entrepot and the Rest of the World Regions
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skilled context of an entrepot country such as Canada. In addition,
the USA only has a modest entry gate for permanent highly skilled
(E class visa) immigrants. Thus, in fact the USA is not the initial
destination of the majority of highly skilled permanent Chinese
immigrants.
10 Borjas and Bratsburg (1996) argue that only if the acquired
human capital in the entrepot country is complementary to existing
capital in the USA or the original sending region would the best
leave. If the immigrant arrivals receive human capital in the
entrepot countries which yields a higher return by staying (second
language acquisition) then the brightest would stay in the entrepot
country.
11 Naïve economic theory would answer this question in the
affirmative. However, transactions costs loom large in any move
and they grow over the household’s lifetime. Finally, people stay
to access public goods in the high tax environment. Hence, the
answer to the question is not at all obvious.
12 See Anderson and Konrad (2001). In particular, they explore the
effect of increased mobility or globalization on the incentives to
invest in human capital, with and without subsidies, and in the
absence of an insurance scheme to forestall the impact of post-
investment taxation on the returns to human capital.
13 By adapting the complete DeVoretz-Iturralde (2000) stayer
model to this circulation model these questions can be answered.
14 This is the naïve explanation owing to the Neo-classical
arguments of the 1980’s and earlier. Clearly, return migrants who
have acquired complementary human capital in the entrepot
country have not failed but are motivated to return by a higher
reward in the original sending country.
15 As noted immigrant quotas prevent most highly skilled
immigrants from directly entering either the USA or Hong Kong
from China.
16 For a minority of Chinese immigrants to Canada this repeated
movement has earned them the term astronauts.
17 In China, one of our selected countries, intellectuals and the
highly trained have had, in the past, their privileges removed as
they were banished to the countryside in the late 1960’s. In the
absence of immigration, their human capital and the country’sDon J. DeVoretz and John Ma
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output suffered. However, in the 1990’s, intellectuals and other
skilled workers (under some restrictions) are free to leave China.
18 Clearly if the required lobbying effort is small to successfully
protect your job, this limited action will be carried out, and the
individual will stay given the high costs of movement.
19 This condition holds for those potential emigres who are on the
margin where mobility costs just equal gain from moving. These
added costs imposed by the Emperor push the marginal highly
skilled immigrants. See Epstein et al. (1999) for a complete
exposition of this point in the form of a formal proof.
20 In order to offset the loss of productivity to the  Empire from the
permitted emigration, a sufficient number of immigrants must
return with added training to offset the loss of those who remain.
In this sense the best must return in sufficient numbers.
21 For example, upon return the conditions of extant family
members may be improved by granting them benefits that they
formally did not enjoy.
22 It should be remembered that an optimistic Emperor believed
that mobility rights would allow the highly skilled to emigrate,
gain skills in the entrepot country and then return with skills which
would increase productivity in the Empire. This is all predicated on
a sufficient number of return emigres from the entrepot to the
sending country. When this optimism is not realized as in China
circa 2002 the Emperor must resort to bribes.
23 Formally the decision as argued by DeVoretz and Iturralde
(2000a) is that the reservation wage, which keeps the potential
émigré in the entrepot country, is now exceeded by either (or both)
the potential income gains in the ROW or sending country after the
enhancement of human capital and the acquisition of entrepot
citizenship in the entrepot country. If the immigrant does not gain
human capital appropriate for the production functions in the ROW
and/or the sending country but specific to the entrepot country,
then the income gain from staying will exceed the gain from
leaving. See DeVoretz and Itturalde (2000) for a more complete
exposition of this condition.
24 The settlement worker by definition provides human capital to
increase the productivity of all immigrant arrivals in the entrepot
society and reduce the risk of return migration. Settlement workers     Triangular Human Capital Flows between Sending,
Entrepot and the Rest of the World Regions
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may also have altruistic motives, namely to ease the immigrant’s
integration into society. However, in entrepot countries such as
Australia, Canada, Germany, and especially Israel, government
subsidies to private altruistic agencies is predicated on increasing
the staying probability of the recent arrival and to increase the
immigrant’s contribution to the society. To this extent this
governmental motive is not altruistic.
25 In the Canadian context human capital acquisition for the
Canadian economy is the central investment made by the agent in
period 1. Examples include: access to labour market information,
validation of certificates, recognition of professional credentials
and language training (English and French).
26 Thus, immigrants who enter post-secondary education to acquire
a general (to the ROW) skill with little or no specific human
capital acquisition from an agent in period 1 will be more apt to
leave.
27 The mobility costs for Chinese immigrants living in Canada
without Canadian citizenship are the waiting and legal costs to
obtain a permanent visa (E type) for the USA. These are
considerable costs. With Canadian citizenship a NAFTA visa is
obtained the same day as application with no lawyer required.
Furthermore, there is no queue for this NAFTA visa and thus the
probability of entry is certain if side conditions are met.
28 Both the European Union and Canada (or the United States)
allow immigrants who acquire citizenship in their respective areas
to enter into a merged labour market.
29 If there exist positive externalities from a country’s brain drain
as argued by Stark (1997) then the number of movers under a
market solution would be sub-optimal. Obviously if there are
negative externalities on production in the sending region from this
movement as the traditional brain drain literature argued in the
1970’s, then the free market solution is too large.
30  A variation of this tenure is temporary status with an overall
quota and end date. The “green card “, or temporary highly skilled
immigrant recruitment program in Germany, and the H1B
temporary worker visa program in the United States, both are
illustrations of this variation.Don J. DeVoretz and John Ma
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31 The temporary entry gate to the ROW with a queue is available
to any entrepot immigrant (or any highly skilled immigrant in the
world); however, the time cost plus legal fees are substantial.
Thus, the existence of  unique non-queue entry gate for entrepot
immigrants (with entrepot citizenship) reduces the transactions
costs and the time in queue.  This will hasten the departure of those
eligible to use this gate.
32 The ROW by definition is so large that even if it has a relative
disadvantage in one or more skills relative to the entrepot country ,
the ROW will still have a larger labour market for that skill.
33 As DeVoretz and Iturralde (2001) have shown this is a small
percentage of the stock of potential movers, approximately 5 to 20
per cent.
34 These conditions either increased the probable income gain from
a move or lowered the mobility costs of movement.
35